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CASE COMMENTS

WIFE'S RIGHT TO RENTS FROM TENANCY BY ENTIRETY
When marital relations become strained, a husband and wife owning property as tenants by the entirety' occasionally call upon the
law to determine whether rental income is being equitably distributed.
Usually it is the wife who seeks to compel her husband, as manager
of the family's property, to account for rents or for the fair rental
value of the entirety property. Whether the wife is entitled to such
an accounting depends primarily upon how Married Women's Property Acts2 are construed in the jurisdiction in which the entirety
property is located.
In the recent case of Howard v. Howard,3 the wife, Hannah,
sought a decree requiring her husband, Albert, to pay her one-half
of the fair rental value of a two-story building held by the entirety.
The first floor was used exclusively in connection with Albert's tavern
'Tenancy by the entirety is a form of concurrent ownership by husband and
wife wherein each spouse is said to be seized not of a moiety, but of the entire
estate. 2 Blackstone, Commentaries *182. The tenants must in fact be husband
and wife. See Kepner, The Effect of an Attempted Creation of an Estate by the
Entirety in Unmarried Grantees, 6 RuTERs L. REV. 550 (1952). At common law
tenancy by the entirety did not include personalty, but at present a majority of
the decisions support the conclusion that a tenancy by the entirety may be created
in personal property, M. Lit, Inc. v. Berger, 225 Md. 241, 17o A.2d 303 (1961);
Oliver v. Givens, 204 Va. 123, 129 S.E.2d 661 (1963); Campbell v. Campbell, 167 Tenn.
77, 66 S.W.2d 99 o (1934). Cf. Dorf v. Tuscarora Pipe Line Co., 48 N.J. Super. 26,
136 A.2d 778 (App. Div. 1957) (tenancy by entireties does not exist in personalty
in New Jersey).
2
The following are some typical acts:
MAss. GEN. LAWs ch. 209, § 1 (1955): "The real and personal property of a
woman shall upon her marriage remain her separate property, and a married
woman may receive, receipt for, hold, manage and dispose of property, real
and personal, in the same manner as if she were sole."
N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS § 3-301 (McKinney 1964): "A married woman has all
the rights in respect to property, real or personal, and the acquisition, use, enjoyment and disposition thereof...."
Wvo. LAws § 20-22 (1957): "All the property... belonging to any married
woman as her sole and separate property... shall, notwithstanding her marriage,
be and remain during coverture her sole and separate property under his sole
control and be held, owned, possessed and enjoyed by her the same as though
she were ... unmarried, and shall not be subject to the disposal, control or interference of her husband...."
According to Professor Powell, these acts were passed because of "the increased
independence of women .... the demands of creditors for increased access to the
assets of their debtors .... a movement for simplification in the law by the elimination of a category of ownership, believed to be no longer sufficiently useful to
justify its separate existence."
4 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY
620 (1965).
1225 A.2d 456 (Md. 1967).
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and restaurant business, while the second floor contained the Howards'
living quarters. However, "the days of wine and roses... [had] fled
and the marital ties... [were] faint and fretful."' 4 Hannah complained

that Albert enjoyed a "grossly disproportionate share" of the income
from his profitable first-floor business.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed,5 as a matter of law,
the lower court's denial of Hannah's right to an accounting for
one-half the fair rental value of the entirety premises. This decision
was based on the fact that a presumption that the spouses were
sharing the benefits of the property arose because the spouses were
living together. Presumably, had the spouses been separated, the presumption could have been overcome. 6
The interpretation of Married Women's Property Acts in jurisdictions still recognizing tenancy by the entirety7 has resulted in three
approaches to resolving the question of whether to permit an action
for an accounting for rents from entirety property: (i) a common
law approach used where the Married Women's Property Act is
interpreted as not affecting tenancies by the entirety, (2) a presumption
of joint use approach used where the Act has been interpreted as
entitling the spouses to equal use and occupancy of the entirety
estate, and (3) a tenancy in common approach used where the Act
has been interpreted as changing tenancies by entireties into tenancies
in common.
Under the first, or common law approach, used in Massachusetts,
Michigan, and North Carolina, a wife has no right to maintain an
action of account. 8 In these states, the incidents of tenancy by the
entireties are considered rooted in property law, as distinguished
4

1d. at 457.
1d. at 456.
6The court deferred 'for another day" what the "nature and extent of Hannah's
5

rights may be ... if and when they begin to live separate and apart...." 225 A.2d

at 458. See Fung v. Chang, 47 Hawaii 149, 384 P.2d 303 (1963) (husband's exclusive
right to control entirety property not conclusive of such right being exercised to
exclusion of wife); Fugua v. Merchants Loan & Sav. Ass'n, 114 Ind. App. 607, 54
N.E.2d 287 (1944) (just because some benefit flows to husband is not sufficient to
take entirety property from the wife).
7In some jurisdictions, the acts were construed to abolish tenancy by the
entirety. E.g., Donegan v. Donegan, 1o3 Ala. 488, 15 So. 823 (1894); Mittel v.
Karl, 133 Ill. 65, 24 N.E. 553 (1890); Appeal of Robinson, 88 Me. 17, 33 AtI. 652
(1895).

SLicker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass, 4o3, 164 N.E. 613 (1929); Morrill v. Morrill, 138
Mich. 112, 1o1 N.V. 209 (19o4); Duplin County v. Jones, 267 N.C. 68, 147 S.E.2d
6o3 (1966).
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from being derived from the marital relation of the spousesO It follows as a matter of strict logic from this view that Married Women's
Property Acts, altering the legal nature of marital unity by enlarging
a woman's dominion over her property, do not affect tenancies by
entireties. It has been said that since the husband is subject to the
common law standard "it would be anomalous to set up a different
standard to measure her [the wife's] interest....-10 The common law
standard referred to entitles the husband to the exclusive use and
occupancy of the estate as well as to the rents arising therefrom."
The exclusive nature of the husband's rights is so well entrenched in
the law of tenancy by the entirety of Michigan, 12 for example, that
there cannot be a valid agreement between the spouses to share
equally the profits of the property. Such deprivation of a wife's enjoyment of the entirety estate may appear to be unjust, but the fact
is that without exception the cases in Michigan, Massachusetts, and
North Carolina, involving the question of a wife's right to the
economic benefits of the estate seek to protect her, not to deprive
her.' 3 The husband has been held to possess an exclusive right to
rents and profits in order to thwart tax liens, 14 in order to shelter
the wife from creditors,' 5 in order to preclude the wife's tort liability
connected with the entirety property,' 6 and in order to protect the
wife's survivorship interest.'7
Courts using the second, or presumption of joint use approach,
say that a husband's common law right to the exclusive use of the
'Raptes v. Cheros, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927); Arrand v. Graham,
297 Mich. 559, 298 N.W. 281 (1941); Duplin County v. Jones, 267 N.C. 68, 147

S.E.2d 6o3 (1966). Michigan and North Carolina differ from Massachusetts in
their treatment of the tenancy in that in those two states the use and profits
or not subject to the husband's separate debts. Phipps, Tenancies by the Entireties, 25 TMP. L.Q. 24, 50 (1951).

' 0Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613, 615 (1929).
"Cunningham v. Ganley, 267 Mass. 375, 166 N.E. 712 (1929); Duplin County
v. Jones, 267 N.C. 68, 147 S.E.2d 603 (1966). It is frequently acknowledged that
the common law right of the husband to control, manage, and use estates by
entireties is founded on the common law rule that the husband controls his wife's
real estate during marriage. E.g., Branch v. Polk, 61 Ark. 388, 33 S.W. 424 (1895);
Babb v. Perley, 1 Me. 6 (182o); Riley's Adm'r v. Riley, 19 N.J. Eq. 229 (Ch. 1868);
Hies v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 3o6, 39 N.E. 337 (1895); O'Malley v. O'Malley, 272 Pa.
528, 116 Atl. 500 (1922).
'-Morrill v. Morrill, 138 Mich. 112, lO N.W. 209 (19o4).
"See Voight v. Voight, 252 Mass. 582, 147 N.E. 887 (1925).
"Duplin County v. Jones, 267 N.C. 68, 147 S.E.2d 6o3 (1966).
FLicker v. Gluskin, 265 Mass. 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929).
1
'Wingrove v. Leney, 312 Mass. 683, 45 N.E.2d 837 (1942); Dombrowski v.
Gorecki, 291 Mich. 678, 289 N.W. 293 (1939).
"Raptes v. Cheros, 259 Mass. 37, 155 N.E. 787 (1927).
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entirety premises is derived from his marital rights rather than from
an inherent property law incident of the tenancy.' s Married Women's
Property Acts are therefore construed to restrict the husband's exclusive right to use and control entirety property. A presumption of
income sharing arises from the fact that each spouse not only owns
the whole estate, but is equally entitled to its use and occupancy. 1
In practice, the notion of presumptive joint use has been the basis
for compelling husbands to account to their wives for one-half of the
proceeds from the sale of entirety property, 20 for one-half of the
mortgage payments on a mortgage executed to husband and wife
by the entirety, 21 and to one-half of the rents from the entirety estate
when the spouses are separated. 22 Annapolis Banking & Trust Co. v.
Smith, stated that "the tenants have ... rights in the common property inter sese, which can be enforced only on the assumption that the
husband and wife are... two persons." 23 In Elko v. Elko 2 4 husband
and wife were separated, but the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
holding that the wife was entitled to one-half of the rents from
apartments held by the entirety, stated that it was deciding the broad
question of "whether the wife... is entitled to one-half of the net
rents received from the two apartments .... -25 In Collier v. Collier'8E.g., Carver v. Gilbert, 387 P.2d 928 (Alaska 1963); Branch v. Polk, 61 Ark.
388, 3 S.W. 424 (1895); Fairclaw v. Forrest, 13o F.2d 829 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Bailey
v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 1o3 So. 833 (1925); Fung v. Chang, 47 Hawaii 149, 384 P.2d
303 (1963); "French v. Nat'l Ref. Co., 217 Ind. 121, 26 N.E.2d 47 (1940); Hoffman
v. Newell, 249 Ky. 270, 60 S.W.2d 607 (1932); Masterman v. Masterman 129 Md. 167,
98 Atl. 537 (1916); Schwind v. O'Halloran, 346 Mo. 486, 142 S.W.2d 55 (1940);

Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N.J. Eq. 651, 9 Atl. 695 (Err & App. 1887); Hiles v. Fisher,
144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337 (1895); Berhalter v. Berhalter, 315 Pa. 225, 173 Ati.
172 (1934); Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 R.I. 452, 25 A.2d 354 (1942); Vasilion v. Vasilion,

192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 (1951); Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 75 Wyo. 444,
297 P.2d 213 (1956).

IONew York Life Ins. Co. v. Oates, 122 Fla. 540, 166 So. 269 (1935); Whitelock
v. Whitelock, 156 Md. 115, 143 At. 712, 715 (1928) ("in this state the wife shares

equally with the husband in the income from a tenancy by the entireties.").
'0Brell v. Brell, 143 Md. 443, 122 At. 635 (1923); Hardy v. Hardy, 250 F. Supp.

956 (D.D.C. 1966) (according to Maryland law, wife entitled to one-half of sale
proceeds of tenancy by the entirety, and such right to proceeds not forfeited by
wife's desertion of her husband).
nWhitelock v. Whitelock, 156 Md. 115, 143 At. 712 (1928).
'2Elko v. Elko, 187 Md. 161, 49 A.2d 441 (1946). As to the tenancy under tax

laws, see Lipsitz v. Comm'r, 220 F.2d 871 (4th Cir. 1955) (under Maryland law,
each spouse is ordinarily subject to tax for one-half of the income from entirety
property). Cf. Duplin County v. Jones, 267 N.C. 68, 147 S.E.2d 603 (1966) (since
only the husband is subject to the tax, tax lien cannot attach to entirety property).
2164 Md. 8, 164 Atl. 157, 159 (1933).

21187 Md. 161, 49 A.2d 441 (1946).
49 A.2d at 442.
2 82 Md. 82, 32 A.-2d 469 (1943).
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the same court inferred that as to business property owned by the
entirety, and occupied by the husband in connection with his business, the wife would have been entitled to an accounting for the
fair rental value had her conduct not been responsible for the
spouses' marital difficulties. The court observed that "it may be
deduced as a general rule that courts of equity will assume jurisdiction
to protect the interest of one or the other spouse in property held
as tenants by the entireties." 27 These cases suggest that the wife has
an interest involving actual enjoyment of the use of the whole estate
of which she is an owner. 28 Furthermore, it makes no difference
whether a wife seeks an accounting for rents collected or for fair
rental value, since "either spouse presumptively has the power to
act for both, so long as the marriage subsists ... provided the fruits
or proceeds of such action inure to the benefit of both....-29 Consequently, where one spouse designates a particular use of the entirety
property, the other spouse should be able to "acquiesce therein and
assert a right to share equally in the rents derived therefrom."' 0
The third, or tenancy in common approach, is represented by five
states in which Married Women's Property Acts have been construed
to change tenancy by the entirety to tenancy in common. 31 Thus, in
New York, New Jersey, Arkansas, Oregon, and Missouri, tenants by
the entirety are each entitled to one-half of the rents from entirety
property during marriage. 32 Even where the wife has unjustifiably
A.2d at 473. (Emphasis added.)
"In Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391, 408-09 (1871), the extent of a wife's
enjoyment was emphasized:
The property belongs as much to the wife as to the husband, and she has
just as clear, undoubted, and equitable a right to the use and enjoyment of
the property during the existence of the marriage, as she has to succeed
to the estate upon the death of her husband. The opposite doctrine is full
of absurdities and gross injustice .... The rights of the wife in the joint
property are as sacred as those of the husband, and should firmly secured,
guarded and protected by the law as are his.... there is gross iniquity
and injustice in permitting the husband to deprive the wife of the use and
enjoyment of an estate that does not belong exclusively to either, but to
both, and which belongs as much to thewife as to the husband.
nMadden v. Gosztonyi Sav. & Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476, 200 At. 624, 63o-31 (1938).
nSchweitzer v. Evans, 360 Pa. 552, 63 A.2d 39, 41 (1949).
""[T]o say that the [Married Women's Property Act, Ark. Const. of 1874, Art.
9 § 7] did not apply to an estate by entirety would be to deprive her [the wife]
of a share in the rents and profits of such an estate during the life of her husband...." Branch v. Polk, 61 Ark. 388, 33 S.W. 424, 425 (1895).
2"In virtue of the marriage relation [at common law], the husband took possession, and deprived the wife of the enjoyment of her estate or interest in the
lands during their joint lives. In my opinion, the object and effect of the married
woman's act is to extinguish this right.... " Buttlar v. Rosenblath, 42 N.J. Eq.
'732
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left the marital home, she has been allowed an accounting. The
only instance in which an accounting will not be permitted is where
one spouse is suing for the fair rental value of the other spouse's use
and occupancy, "unless he has taken and kept possession of such
premises as are not capable of a joint occupation, which is, in effect,
an exclusion of his co-tenant." 34 Where tenants by entireties are regarded as tenants in common, the wife need only prove that her
husband did not distribute to her the proper share of entireties rent
or one-half the rental value if she has been excluded from the property.
Lohmann v. Lohmann35 exemplifies the third approach. Julia and
Fred Lohmann lived together as man and wife and owned certain
realty as tenants by the entirety. Julia had no legal interest in the
profitable parking lot, tavern and restaurant business that Fred
operated on the premises. Reasoning that Julia was "ousted" from
the estate because the portion of the premises occupied by Fred's
business was incapable of joint occupancy, the New Jersey court
required Fred to account to Julia for one-half of the reasonable rental
value of the part of the premises occupied by Fred's business. The
court submitted a practical definition of an "ouster" that will permit
an action of account:
An ouster by a co-tenant does not necessarily mean physical
eviction or exclusion but means possession attended by such
circumstances as to evince a claim of exclusive right and a denial
of the right of the other tenant to participate in the profits.30
651, 9 At. 695, 698 (Err. & App. 1887). In Neubeck v. Neubeck, 94 N.J. Eq. 197,
119 At. 26, 27 (Err. & App. 1922), it was stated that
[The title to lands rests in a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety,
the wife holds in her possession during their joint lives one-half of the
estate in common with her husband, and that respective rights of the
parties as between themselves ... [are] those of tenants in common.
See Branch v. Polk, 61 Ark. 388, 33 S.W. 424 (1895); Rezabek v. Rezabek, 186 Mo.
App. 673, 192 S.W. 107 (1917), Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 3o6, 39 N.E. 337 (1895);
Brownley v. Lincoln County, 218 Ore. 7, 343 P.2d 529 (1959). A contingent
remainder exists in the survivor. Martos v. Martos, 134 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
3'Neubeck v. Neubeck, 94 N.J. Eq. 167, 119 At. 26 (Err. & App. 1922) (wife
unjustifiably deserted husband and lived in adultery; nevertheless, entitled to an
accounting for rents and profits from entirety property); Martos v. Martos, 134
N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (wife's desertion precluded husband's liability to
support wife, but wife was still entitled to one-half the rents from the spouse's
entirety property).
"Davidson v. Thompson, 22 N.J. Eq. 83, 85 (Ch. 1871).
ato N.J. Super. 37, 141 A.2d 84 (App. Div. 1958), afl'd, 57 N.J. Super. 347,
154 A.2d 741 (App. Div. 1959).
'141 A.2d at 91. See Maxwell v. Eckert, 1o9 At. 730 (N.J. Ch. 192o) (exclusion

may occur where there is no express refusal by the tenant in possession if possession has been taken by him and used by him as his own or for his exclusive profit).
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Thus, under the third approach, an accounting is allowed a wife
who can show she has been excluded from the use of tenancy premises.
The court pointed out that
[N]o longer is there a doubt that had defendant here [husband] rented out the parking area, bar and restaurant part
of the premises to a third person and collected rents therefor,
he would be required to account to plaintiff [wife]. We observe
no distinction between defendant's renting out business premises
to a stranger while acting as if defendant were the sole owner,
and taking possession of
part of the business premises as if
37
he were the sole owner.
It is submitted that underlying the question of entirety rent distribution is the problem of how to respect a wife's rights without
unduly fettering her husband's management of the entirety property.
Under the first approach the husband's management rights prevail,
while under the third approach the wife's ownership rights are
dominant. Howard, under the second approach, attempted to
balance the spouse's interests by requiring the wife to prove the
absence of rent sharing before the court would interfere with the
husband's management of the entirety premises. However, the court's
conclusion that absence of separation of the spouses makes the presumption of rent sharing conclusive seems both illogical and unjust.
It presupposes that the wife had access to the whole estate, including
the business portions. While the presumption of rent sharing may
be considered conclusive as to living quarters held by the entirety
when the spouses live together, there is no reason why a conclusive
presumption should be extended to the business portions if the spouses
live together. As Lohmann clearly shows, exclusion of the wife may
exist as to business portions of the entirety estate while the spouses
are living together. In short, the practical effect of Howard is to
compel a spouse to separate from her husband if she wishes to
benefit from her distinct ownership interest.
MARK

37141 A.2d at 9g.
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